Biological auctions with multiple rewards Journal Article

Author(s): Reiter, Johannes G; Kanodia, Ayush; Gupta, Raghav; Nowak, Martin A; Chatterjee, Krishnendu
Article Title: Biological auctions with multiple rewards
Affiliation IST Austria
Abstract: The competition for resources among cells, individuals or species is a fundamental characteristic of evolution. Biological all-pay auctions have been used to model situations where multiple individuals compete for a single resource. However, in many situations multiple resources with various values exist and single reward auctions are not applicable. We generalize the model to multiple rewards and study the evolution of strategies. In biological all-pay auctions the bid of an individual corresponds to its strategy and is equivalent to its payment in the auction. The decreasingly ordered rewards are distributed according to the decreasingly ordered bids of the participating individuals. The reproductive success of an individual is proportional to its fitness given by the sum of the rewards won minus its payments. Hence, successful bidding strategies spread in the population. We find that the results for the multiple reward case are very different from the single reward case. While the mixed strategy equilibrium in the single reward case with more than two players consists of mostly low-bidding individuals, we show that the equilibrium can convert to many high-bidding individuals and a few low-bidding individuals in the multiple reward case. Some reward values lead to a specialization among the individuals where one subpopulation competes for the rewards and the other subpopulation largely avoids costly competitions. Whether the mixed strategy equilibrium is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) depends on the specific values of the rewards.
Keywords: Evolutionary game theory; Auction theory; Evolutionary dynamics; Evolutionarily stable strategy
Journal Title: Proceedings of the Royal Society of London Series B Biological Sciences
Volume: 282
Issue 1812
ISSN: 0962-8452
Publisher: Royal Society, The  
Date Published: 2015-07-15
Start Page: Article number: 20151041
Sponsor: This work was supported by grants from the John Templeton Foundation, ERC Start Grant (279307: Graph Games), FWF NFN Grant (No S11407N23 RiSE/SHiNE), FWF Grant (No P23499N23) and a Microsoft faculty fellows award.
DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2015.1041
Open access: yes (repository)
IST Austria Authors
  1. Johannes Reiter
    12 Reiter
  2. Matthias Nowak
    15 Nowak
Related IST Austria Work