Evolution of decisions in population games with sequentially searching individuals Journal Article


Author(s): Priklopil, Tadeas; Chatterjee, Krishnendu
Article Title: Evolution of decisions in population games with sequentially searching individuals
Affiliation IST Austria
Abstract: In many social situations, individuals endeavor to find the single best possible partner, but are constrained to evaluate the candidates in sequence. Examples include the search for mates, economic partnerships, or any other long-term ties where the choice to interact involves two parties. Surprisingly, however, previous theoretical work on mutual choice problems focuses on finding equilibrium solutions, while ignoring the evolutionary dynamics of decisions. Empirically, this may be of high importance, as some equilibrium solutions can never be reached unless the population undergoes radical changes and a sufficient number of individuals change their decisions simultaneously. To address this question, we apply a mutual choice sequential search problem in an evolutionary game-theoretical model that allows one to find solutions that are favored by evolution. As an example, we study the influence of sequential search on the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation. For this, we focus on the classic snowdrift game and the prisoner’s dilemma game.
Keywords: Evolutionary game theory; sequential search; Evolution of cooperation; Mutual choice; Optional interactions; Partner choice
Journal Title: Games
Volume: 6
Issue 4
ISSN: 2073-4336
Publisher: Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute  
Date Published: 2015-09-29
Start Page: 413
End Page: 437
Copyright Statement: CC-BY
URL:
DOI: 10.3390/g6040413
Notes: The research leading to these results has received funding from the People Programme (Marie Curie Actions) of the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007–2013) under REAGrant Agreement No. 291734, the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) S11407-N23 (RiSE/SHiNE) and the ERCStart Grant (279307: Graph Games).
Open access: yes (OA journal)