Optional interactions and suspicious behaviour facilitates trustful cooperation in prisoners dilemma Journal Article


Author(s): Priklopil, Tadeas; Chatterjee, Krishnendu; Nowak, Martin A
Article Title: Optional interactions and suspicious behaviour facilitates trustful cooperation in prisoners dilemma
Affiliation IST Austria
Abstract: In evolutionary game theory interactions between individuals are often assumed obligatory. However, in many real-life situations, individuals can decide to opt out of an interaction depending on the information they have about the opponent. We consider a simple evolutionary game theoretic model to study such a scenario, where at each encounter between two individuals the type of the opponent (cooperator/defector) is known with some probability, and where each individual either accepts or opts out of the interaction. If the type of the opponent is unknown, a trustful individual accepts the interaction, whereas a suspicious individual opts out of the interaction. If either of the two individuals opt out both individuals remain without an interaction. We show that in the prisoners dilemma optional interactions along with suspicious behaviour facilitates the emergence of trustful cooperation.
Keywords: partial information; Evolutionary game theory; Evolution of cooperation; Optional interactions; Non-social behaviour
Journal Title: Journal of Theoretical Biology
Volume: 433
ISSN: 1095-8541
Publisher: Academic Press  
Date Published: 2017-11-21
Start Page: 64
End Page: 72
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.08.025
Notes: The research leading to these results has received funding from the People Programme (Marie Curie Actions) of the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007–2013) under REAGrant Agreement No. 291734, the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) S11407-N23 (RiSE/SHiNE), the ERCStart Grant (279307: Graph Games) and the John Templeton Foundation.
Open access: no